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Abstract 
 
Immigration and economic growth in a contemporary scene yield in-
triguing data on the current state of EU’s economy and more so, on the basis of 
the European Union. This papers strives to gather objective data and formulate 
a consensus on how integration of economic immigrants arriving in Europe 
preemptively aid EU’s economy in the future as member state populations are 
rapidly aging. Methodology consists of analysis and evidence from previous 
studies dealing with, EU’s current state of economy, population aging as a phe-
nomena and economic effects of migration taking place globally. The purpose is 
to provide comparative analysis on Hungary and Sweden’s labor markets and 
economic effects of aging demographics. Findings conclude that only swift eco-
nomic inclusion of immigrants has the power of partly offsetting negative eco-
nomic implications regarding immigration and demo- graphic aging with the help 
of progressive labor market policies.  
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1 Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine and analyse how the European 
Union and its common economy has been influenced by immigrants and refu-
gees. The foundation of EU depends on a swift flow of workforce across its 
member states. As it stands immigrants and refugees have always generated 
different opinions on the matter of immigration and integration. Arguably the 
short-term costs involved in facilitating immigrants in a member state tend to 
strain fiscal budgets for number of reason varying from health care bills to wel-
fare costs. As time progresses the long terms benefits of immigration tend over 
weigh the negative fiscal costs as immigrants integrate into their host countries 
society and more so into the economy. Therefore, this paper focuses on the 
economic implications of immigration flows and argues that the future of EU’s 
economic is ever so dependent on immigration flows to fill in the demographic 
challenges which lie ahead. The aging population of EU already is depending 
on foreign labor to fill in the gap aging workforce is leaving behind. In order to 
fully understand and objectively portray the effects of immigration and lately ref-
ugee flows it require a deeper understanding of historic performance of immi-
gration.  
However, EU foreign policy and relations with its neighbouring countries 
are the essence why the union has been able to keep peace and security in the 
region for the longest consecutive time in the history of the continent. Yet as EU 
has been expanding steadily ever since it was founded, as EU battles ideologi-
cally between economic and societal progress. Member states have constantly 
argued for and against supranational policy making, which therefore sways the 
common narrative on immigration amongst other matters. Currently the trending 
xenophobia and and right wing politics especially shaking the political land-
scape in the France, Germany and UK has effected the political atmosphere on 
EU level where a paradigm shift occurs towards protecting native EU workers 
from foreign labor. Hence, essentially this paper hopes to provide objective data 
on how this multifaceted immigration flows and economic integration of immi-
grants effect the state of the entire EU’s economy so that political landscape 
would not be smeared with groundless opinions based on prejudice.  
 
 
  
 
Historical data from migration provides plentiful of implications and analy-
sis on how previous migrant flows have settled in European economies. For 
instance, the effect of Turkish immigrants residing in Germany has sparked de-
bate on the failed integration of Turkish immigrants which has therefore contrib-
uted to rising un- employment and living of welfare. The creation of parallel so-
ciety amongst the immigrants has proven to be increased by the exclusion and 
unequal treatment of Turkish immigrants in the labor force. As globalization ac-
celerates international labor market competition, it sets incremental pressure on 
the labor force and more so on the ability of German economy to stay afloat 
during the intensification of competition. The declining demographics in Germa-
ny coupled with diminishing birth rates showcase just how paramount the inclu-
sion of immigrants into the labor force is. Political will and narrative determines 
how successfully mechanism are put into place to improve the inclusion of Turk-
ish populations, whom in turn provide higher birth rates and significantly young-
er population, both desirable factors contributing towards benefiting the econo-
my as a whole (Neumeier, 2015).  
The inclusion of immigration is one step among several other aspects, bat-
tling the shrinking of population and safeguarding the economic well being in 
the future, yet it remains unseen how much political will actually prevails and in 
which timeframe these implications will take place and how much of an impact 
can the Turkish population in this instance contribute to the overall GDP for ex-
ample. Matters between immigration and demographic challenges are multidi-
mensional and consist of variable aspects, which according to traditional eco-
nomics are hard to alter in reality, for example the cultural barriers and xeno-
phobia. Thus the responsibility for law makers alone does not act as an abso-
lute guarantee to secure optimal inclusion of immigrants, however policy making 
is the backbone of providing fertile ground for economic prosperity while dimin-
ishing socio-economic barriers between the native population and immigrants 
and migrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1.2 Aims of the Research 
 
The aim of this research center around analyzing the current state of the 
EU’s economy and the main reasons affecting the future growth and obstacles. 
Fundamentally the paper will focus on previous research and hopes to achieve 
a common census on the ramification or effects of the aging population and how 
immigration could fuel the future growth of the economy and alleviate the de-
mographic crisis underway by providing adequate data quantifying the issues at 
hand. Additionally, this papers pursues to highlight the underlying reason for 
population aging in majority of the EU member states.  
The essence of this study focuses on aiming at answering, how does mi-
gration affect EU member states’ economy and the ageing populations in Eu-
rope? Governments ought to be promoting and pursuing swift economic integra-
tion of immigrants, since in order for migration to positively battle the effects 
posed by ageing populations in developed countries governments should act 
accordingly to facilitate immigration effectively.  
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
Predominantly this research will be based on secondary resources, since 
this study aims at forming a comprehensive analysis on the ramifications of im-
migration and demographic crisis in EU. Thus this paper a theoretical study and 
methodology will be based heavily on academic journals and papers published 
by credible sources such as EU commission, World Bank, IMF. Studies con-
cerning aging populations are easily available and historical data from de-
mographics and previous migration reports will be imperative for this study as 
well in order to draw valid conclusions. Limitations within the research lies in 
focusing on relevant data to serve the greater purpose of this research. In order 
to stay within the scope of the research and preserve the findings, this paper 
will not have in depth analysis on certain aspects concerning policy making on 
EU level especially. The abundance of available material, academic journals for 
instance, has improved the objectivity of this paper. However, it is worth men-
tioning that some of the individual publications used in this research have been 
written by several authors, however to remain objective it has been highlighted 
explicitly, had the author paraphrased an opinion or findings from another au-
thor, institution or report. Therefore, the aim of this research will be on labor 
market implications especially in the context of falling demographics in order for 
the scope to remain realistic and specified.  
  
The challenge of the methodology and paper will be determined by the 
acute- ness of the on-going migration crisis and constant developing of EU poli-
cy making, since that dictates how relevant data will be available and how unbi-
ased it will be. Furthermore, the most of the studies paraphrased in this paper 
are based in broad selection, since peer reviewed reports were unattainable 
which. Due to multifaceted implications the data available of immigration and 
economic effect is rather vast, which will be taken into account in order to pre-
serve the objectivity of the research and its findings. There can be found certain 
common narratives presented in the light of both positive and negative aspects 
of immigration flows, which aids this pa- per in its quest to analyze thoroughly 
what has been previously researched and published. The methodology will ad-
ditionally focus on EU’s member states and re- ports published by their respec-
tive governments, in order to find local indicators pre- dominantly in the strong-
est economies which tend to attract immigration flows. Therefore, regionally 
differing economic phenomena’s and symptoms can be analyzed and scruti-
nized more effectively from the standpoint of the entire economy.  
1.4 Structure of the Paper 
 
The study begins with an overview of statistical data and previous studies 
gathering evidence analyzing the effects of immigration by International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF and European Investment Bank (EIB) ) in accordance with few 
other studies. The purpose is to present arguments, analysis and causality be-
tween studies and showcase certain arguments which have been generally ac-
cepted as predominant arguments essential in this context.  
The second part focuses on demographic developments and projected ag-
ing of population across the globe and more so in EU especially. These ramifi-
cations are presented in light of the future economic progress and prosperity in 
Europe. The aging of population raises fundamental questions and issues in the 
context of labor market implications and fiscal effects for future generations 
across the European Union. Therefore, parameters such as effects of migration 
affecting wages and employment exists in this research, due to the fact that 
previous studies had concluded most visible effects of both demographic de-
cline and migration can be seen in employment and wages.  
 
 
 
 
  
In order to provide realistic implications of immigration and its economic 
effects, third part of this paper consists of a comparative analysis between 
Sweden and Hungary since they inherently have economic similarities worth 
comparing. Both countries economies and demographics are similar, which 
therefore provide quantifiable contrast and analysis on how migration and aging 
demographics have evolved in both states. Additionally, Sweden and Hungary’s 
foreign and immigration policies are rather contradicting in the current political 
climate. Reasons contributing to the choosing Hungary and Sweden for com-
parative analysis lie in the similar size of population, which in both Hungary and 
Sweden is nearly 10 million (World Bank, 2015). Birth rate in Hungary in 2016 
was estimated to stand at 9.1 births per 1000 people, while in Sweden the same 
rate stood at 12 (MIP). Similar death rate in Hungary in 2016 was estimated to 
be 12,8 and in Sweden the respective rate was 9,4 (MIP). Additionally, Sweden 
and Hungary has conflicting migration policies within the context of EU. Swe-
dish migration policy emphasizes the importance of addressing and promoting 
labor based migration with close proximity and cooperation with EU’s migration 
policy (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016). Whereas, evidently current Hun-
garian administration shows resistance to cooperate with EU’s policy objectives 
and guidelines. Since 2004, Hungarian administrations have been struggling to 
form a strategy for especially long-term migration (Attila et al., 2015). Main justi-
fication for choosing especially Hungary and Sweden as comparative countries 
is dictated by the contradicting migration policies and the similarity in their de-
mographic indicators.  
Factors limiting the outcome of comparative analysis, between these two 
countries, centers around the availability of unbiased and relevant sources pub-
lished in appropriate time frame and reports concerning the factors taken into 
comparison. Comparative factors consist of labor market composition, current 
trends in labor market, history of demographics and demographic effects of im-
migration. However, limitations additionally in this research exist due to lack of 
similar comparable parameters per se which might effect the findings of the 
comparative research.   
Lastly, the paper aims to summarize and conclude the own perspective of 
the writer and the keys issues as population aging progresses. Thus conclusion 
offers insights on how EU policy making ought to respond, direct and empower 
migration flows towards helping the labor markets and demographic decline in 
EU with a swift economic integration of migrants.  
 
 
  
2 Demographics 
 
2.1 Global Overview 
 
When demographic projections are examined, it is difficult to emphasize the 
uncertainty which haunts theses estimates. Thus, the interpretation of even ac-
ademically acceptable studies and approximations needs to take into account 
that they are barely estimations based of data depending on multifaceted varia-
bles. Fertility and mortality rates and migration may differ greatly in reality from 
the forecast. For instance, world population might peak already in 2070 instead 
of 2100 which reflects in possibly lower population growths as imagined. Prior 
studies and trajectories have been gravitating towards an upward biased esti-
mates than what was actually realized (Benedict et al., 2015). Therefore, as-
sumptions of demographic changes ought to be benchmarked with scrutiny and 
criticism, since such long term calculations tend to distort what the reality in 50 
to 100 years from now might be.  
As fertility rates on average across the globe are experiencing a progres-
sive decline, populations in the developed countries especially, begin to shrink 
during the next decades. IMF estimates that world’s population will peak by 
2100 and from there it will begins to dive. In developed countries populations 
are shrinking more rapidly than elsewhere in the globe, by the end of the current 
century 70% of developed countries will experience shrinking populations and 
65% of developing countries will experience similar effects as well               
(Figure 1.1).  
Steadily, as the portion of old age people in relation to younger population 
increases, hence the ratio as seen in Figure 1.2 indicates that the old-age de-
pendency ratio seems to be growing across the globe from over 10% in 2015 to 
potentially three folding figures by 2100. The aging of population is growing fast 
in less developed countries which account for 83% of the world populations 
nowadays. In more developed countries this ratio could possibly double by the 
end of the century (Benedict et al., 2015). Hungary and Sweden are equally 
experiencing the similar effects aging populations imply globally. Figure 1.3 
compares the developments in each countries ratio and despite similar align-
ments in population size Sweden’s ratio in 2015 was nearly 31% while Hungari-
an labor force seems to age a tad slower with a ratio of 26%.  
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2.2 EU’s Demographic Challenges  
 
 
 
 
  
Demographic projections ought to be interpreted cautiously, since previ-
ous mortality and fertility ratios have proven to decline even faster than antici-
pated, hence the fiscal remarks in turn can be distorted excessively (Benedict et 
al., 2015). The demographic projections in all EU states project a gloomy future 
outlook in the foreseeable future. As Figure 2.1 from EIB (2016) illustrates a 
scenario where the population growth in EU-28 countries will increase from 508 
million to 526 million by 2050, however by 2080 it will decrease to 520 million. 
Figure 2. additionally, weighted the assumed impact of fertility, migration and 
life expectancy on the the forecasts. Hypothetically if migration contributes are 
non existent, EU could potentially report 20% decrease in its population by 
2080. On the other hand, Figure 2.2 presents a similar estimate on working age 
population as Figure 2.3. Figure 2.2 concludes a decline in population from 
roughly 325 million in 2015 to 285 million in 2080 with an estimation, with zero 
migration, the working age population in EU would shrink by 70 million.  
 
Meanwhile, the aging population of EU possess yet another threat to the 
economic well being in Europe. According to United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA, 2016), EU could face a situation coined demographic dividend. During 
demographic dividend countries experience growing working age population 
and dwindling fertility ratios, while the economic and demographic dependency 
ratios surge. Predominantly this opportunity persists for 20 to 30 years during 
which the economic growth inclines (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
 
  
The life expectancy in the EU continues to grow while the number of births 
is falling stunningly below the level of replacement. EIB (2016) suggests that 
constant fertility rate which would keep fertility at a neutral state stands at 2.1. 
The existing EU average is 1,6. Except France and Ireland reports levels clos-
ing near 2,1. Models project a rise from 1,59 in 2013 to 1,68 in 2030 ending at 
1,76 in 2060 in EU. This fact alone fails to illustrate an ending to the aging trend 
in the EU, since it falls short from the benchmarking fertility rate of 2,1. Only 
way of ensuring healthy ratios would be through several decades of fertility over 
2,0 (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
The age dependency ratio which in turn illustrates the age structure of a 
population, moreover it conveys the amount of individuals who are expected to 
be de- pending on the support of others (young and elderly) in relation to those 
individuals whom are providing this support (Eurostat, 2013). This dependency 
ratio has the potential to double while the total working age population is ex-
pected to diminish by 0,3% on a yearly basis until 2060. Rendering to the same 
study working age population decreases from 64% to 44% by 2060. This data is 
quite integral for the EU’s hypothetical economic growth since the working age 
population implies the capabilities of the labor force in relation to the entire pop-
ulation (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.3 shows that the demographic decline will affect 19 countries 
(Austria – Lithuania) in the EU by 2060. Especially Luxembourg, Sweden and 
Belgium are expected to disclose a rather noteworthy increase in working age 
population. On the contrary Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Baltic region are ex-
pected to experience detrimental fall in working age population. Evidently, none 
of the countries show- cased in this figure have working age population growth 
more than the total growth of population (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
The main sources of economic growth in the long run for the EU region 
stem from increased productivity and employment of the labor force. However, 
migration has the prospective to boost the the aforementioned facts by an in-
crease in the demand for skills evolution in the labor market. As the employ-
ment is gravitating towards a more dynamic environment in the near future, in 
composition with the demographic imbalances potentially offer immigrants a 
prosperous basis to fulfill the gaps in EU’s economic progress. The optimism is 
shadowed by certain projections that even if the entire labor sources are em-
ployed, for instance women, inactive people aged 16-65 and unemployed, with 
the addition of the supposed employment growth of 1% annually, the total em-
ployment growth would decline regardless, by 2032 (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
Overwhelmingly, even according to the most optimistic scenarios in regard 
to the demographic developments, the decline in the working age population will 
sup- press the economic growth possibilities. According to EIBs (2016) calcula-
tions, the labor market has to attract and register 61 million people more by 
2030 and a whop- ping 230 million by 2060 in order to keep the ratio of working 
age population to total population stable. The impact of migration to EU demog-
raphy is expected to stand at 14 million by 2030 and 67 by 2060 in EU. Natural-
ly some member states will suffer the burden of demographic imbalances more 
than others, since the migration tends to channel into countries with a dynamic 
labor market and low unemployment, rather than towards regions with aging 
population. Meanwhile the contribution of migration will depend significantly on 
how proficiently migrants will react towards particular skills requirements and 
labor demand from the labor market (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
  
2.2.1 Fiscal Implications of Shrinking Demographics 
Naturally, the shrinking of populations will affect the public spending quite 
noticeably. The increasing number of elderly people will raise the spending on 
public government programs for instance pension and health care. Spending 
related to aging in developed economies are expected to rise roughly 8,5% per-
centage points by 2100. Mainly consisting of health care, while related spending 
of pension would have a limited effect due to prior pension reforms. The impli-
cations in longer run pose a threat to the fiscal stability of developed nations. 
Health spending for in- stance in developed nations could burden the public 
debt ratios over the next 85 years. The current value of the projected increase 
of the health care spending stands 57% of the GDP in 2015 over the course of 
2015-2100 (Benedict et al., 2015). 
3 EU: Economy & Migration 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
The foundation of European economy lays upon the principle of free 
movement of good, capital and labor each one complimenting the existence of 
the Union itself. Consequently, EU’s mission is complicated. The purpose of 
uniting 28 countries and counting, for economic prosperity and maintaining 
peace across Europe has been a road accompanied with several triumphs and 
losses. Yet the rocky road has proven how common consensus and democracy 
has evolved into the the longest streak of peaceful times since World War 2. In 
order to maintain friendly relations with surrounding states while protecting the 
common free market area remains a paradoxical mission of the Union, while its 
economies and states are ever so de- pendent on foreign labor and economic 
immigrants. Alone in 2015 there were 1,2 million people seeking refugee in the 
EU, excluding economic immigrants, from its peripheral non member countries. 
Main drivers for migration flows are war, climate change, demographic chal-
lenges and poverty (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
In the light of refugee crisis concerns arising from the economic effects 
and integration outlooks have caused differing opinions in Europe. The division 
has called upon to be questioned by several member states. Are these people 
arriving seeking economic mobility rather than seeking asylum from a humani-
tarian disaster? Since majority of the arriving people are on route towards eco-
nomically most viable countries on the continent it has shaped the political 
views on how to deal with the current crisis. Germany and UK amongst few 
share the idea of a humanitarian crisis whereas Hungarian prime minister ar-
gues in favor of labeling refugees as migrants seeking to improve economical 
status. This political divisiveness amongst member states seeks to deepen the 
political crevasse and narrative. Due to 1951 Refugee Convention the distinc-
tion between a migrant and refugee is imperative to recognize. People fleeing 
the war atrocities and seeking refuge in foreign country are subject to different 
treatment than a person seeking to improve one’s living standards and econom-
ic prosperity (Diaconu, 2015).  
The trending consensus and implications in Europe centering around mul-
ticulturalism is under going paradigm shift towards a nationalistic approach 
while the underlying reasons are debatable, economic hardship in the post 2008 
financial cri- sis has dried several public and private budgets. Previously immi-
gration friendly countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, have tighten 
their immigration policies and quotas, affecting not only the status of host coun-
try immigrants but the hardship of many arriving (Collett, 2011).  
Even economic viewpoints beg to differ the economic consequences of al-
ien people residing in foreign country. However, the current inflow of refugees 
has the potential to facilitate Europe’s economic and social environments, since 
the fertility rate in Europe has decline overwhelmingly while the life life expec-
tancy has in- creased by 12 years from 1950. Additionally, the lack of working 
age population would have shown observably worsening symptoms in the de-
mographic spectrum, however much obliged by migration the current state isn’t 
as gloomy as it could be. On the other hand, opposing economists argue that 
the negative presence of refugees could be seen varying from land and food 
outbreaks, wage competition, over- strained healthcare capabilities to hike in 
criminal activities. Lastly, refugees and migrants arriving from less developed 
states according to critics tend to strain the economy with supplying excess of 
under educated workforce in comparison to natives, which impacts the outlook 
of sustainable economic development and growth of the entire economy       
(Diaconu, 2015).  
 
  
In order to fully understand the multifaceted aspects of the immigration 
and asylum seeking in EU it requires a scrutinized analysis on different socio-
economic ramifications brought by immigration. The current political atmos-
phere and common census in European politics is filled with polarization of 
opinions. Either one supports immigration or is fundamentally against it. Short 
term costs, political and economical, are undoubtedly involved with immigration 
yet analysis suggests to gaze in the horizon for long term benefits, both fiscal 
and macro economical, seem promising if migrants and refugees are equipped 
with education and employment. It is safe to assume that both forced and eco-
nomic migration flows will have an upward trend in the future of EU due to the 
surrounding conflicts in EU’s peripheral regions fueling economic hardship and 
poverty. (Bernabè et al., 2016).  
 
3.2 Refugees, Migrants & Immigration 
 
3.2.1 Refugees 
 
According to 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees: “A refugee, according to the Convention, is someone who is unable 
or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.”. Therefore, the external reasons behind 
a person fleeing one’s home country define forced migration. Thus a common 
understanding and definition between nations has to exists in order to safe-
guard the well being of people fulfilling the criteria to be labeled as refugees. If 
these people are to be returned to their home country, there might be fatal con-
sequences, meaning that their home country and government is lacking to pro-
vide sufficient protection. The definitions and rights of refugees are laid in 1961 
Convention and OAU Refugee Convention (Edwards, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.2.2 Migrants 
 
Migrants on the other hand are distinguished to be people whom volun-
tarily choose to move and improve their lives mostly due to economic reasons. 
Meaning, migrants have the free choice and will to decide in comparison to ref-
ugees. They aren’t suppressed by external reasons such as war or famine. 
Most importantly they have the right and the possibility to return to their country 
of origin and their domestic government will able to provide them with protection 
(Edwards, 2016).  
 
3.2.3 Immigration 
 
Due to EU level diverse politics, many member states foster the term ref-
ugees or immigrants in the same context since it enables countries to prop their 
own agenda. Specifically, this terminology of immigration potentially affects the 
lives of number of people in vulnerable positions, since merging and mixing the-
se terms has the power of waning the responsibilities governments need to as-
sess over the people it affects the most (Edwards, 2016).  
In light of the current migration crisis the question is who are these peo-
ple migrating in Europe. As this bachelor paper will examine the collective influ-
ence of immigrants and refugees to certain parts of the European economy and 
also for measurable and interpretive reasons they will be regarded as one col-
lective segment in the economy. However, for clarification it is imperative to un-
derstand the difference of division between migrants and refugees and immi-
grants for legal rea- sons. Within the realms of the current migration crisis, Eu-
rope is affected by both refugees and migrants according to (Edwards, 2016). 
Largely people arriving in Greece and Italy are from conflict affected regions, 
hence they regarded as refugees. However, proportionally smaller part of these 
people shoring could be regarded as migrants where these aspects are coined 
under the term immigration.  
All in all, the interpretation between migrants and refugees is highly divi-
sive according to general conventions, yet several humanitarian crises behind 
immigration flows are proven to blur the lines of refugees and migrant to be re-
garded differently. Therefore, the measurable impact of immigrants to an econ-
omy is simpler to be regarded as a common factor for instance in the labor mar-
ket.  
 
  
3.3 Macro Economic Implications of Migration 
 
3.3.1 Labor Market 
 
A recent study from Diaconu in 2015 examines the impact of refugees in 
relation to host countries economic growth between 1962-2012. The results 
persisted that there exists two main ways the arrival of refugees affects the 
economic growth and perpetual prosperity. Firstly, it affects the overall size of 
the labor force by growing the amount of people participating in that sector, 
which in turn shrinks the growth of the income per capita in the host country. 
Secondly, refugees bring talent and human capital to the market which already 
exists and therefore saturates the labor market even further. Therefore, the 
study concludes that in the short run refugees tend to suppress the economic 
growth and in the long run they merely have sizeable effect on economic growth 
(Diaconu, 2015). This study underlines only arriving refugees yet it delivers ar-
guable conclusions, which have to be taken accounted for. Since the integration 
of migrants is paramount to safeguard economic growth and prosperity it must 
be stated that EU’s migration policy and economic growth de- pends on migra-
tion regardless of the root cause of migration as long as the current declining 
demographic trend prevails. European Investments bank (EIB) concludes in 
their study, Migration and the EU: Challenges, Opportunities, the role of EIB 
(2016), that numerous economists assess migration as phenomena where a 
shift exists in lower workforce productivity to regions with higher workforce activ-
ity. Resulting in uneven distribution of workforce amongst the economic region. 
Moreover, the cultural and social ramifications are immeasurable against the 
economic breadth of migration. Migration leaves the country of origin with a 
brain drainage and more so social imbalance scars the future demographics 
and state of the society long in the future (Bernabe et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Until recently, the effects of migration were considered positively across 
many European states. Study from OECD states that between, 2001 and 2011 
immigrants demonstrated 70 % of the increase in workforce in Europe alone. 
Even though migration and workforce needs do not fully correlate, immigrants 
were found to participate in both dynamic and waning sectors of the economy, 
meaning they were dispersed across the economy and labor force (Diaconu, 
2015). Another study concluded by OECD implied that during the first half of 
millennium, 15 % of the entries made my immigrants were made in sectors such 
as Science, Mathematics and Engineering amongst few other sectors. All the 
while 24 % of the counted labor market entries by immigrants, were in declining 
industries e.g. machine operators and assemblers. Positively immigrants were 
more willing to accept work in these fields usually considered unappealing by 
many native workers (Diaconu, 2015). Therefore, the impact of immigration 
cannot be seen myopic, since it clearly pro- vides great basis for the economy 
to thrive in the future by supporting certain unattractive fields with adequate 
workforce participation rates.  
Immigrants however experience hardship in integrating to the host coun-
tries economy as the absorption into the labor market is rather slow. In Europe 
especially the participation rates, employment and wages are on average lower 
in comparison to the natives. Especially the employment and earning gaps are 
noticeable in the next few years of the arriving to the receiving country. As time 
passes employment and earnings gap fades as their language skills and job 
experience increase (Aiyar et al., 2016). In addition to the previous, Immigrants 
from advanced economies tend to outperform ones coming from developing 
economies while female migrants suffer the most in the short run employment 
(Aiyar et al., 2016). After the slow recovery of the 2008 economic crisis, many 
immigrants suffer longer lasting economic consequences if the state of the 
economy they enter is weak, meaning the unemployment is high and the wages 
are low (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3.2 Migrants Education 
 
Some studies propose that the education level of migrants arriving from 
North Africa have in general lower education level than individuals born in Eu-
ropean countries (Diaconu, 2015). Furthermore, the study quoted here argues 
that third of the people whom have entered Europe in the last 15 years are ter-
tiary educated and another third has not finished upper secondary education 
even if majority of these people are over 20 years old (Diaconu, 2015). In 2014 
by Eurostat, EU states which have drawn largest portion of highly educated 
non-EU migrants were Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK with tertiary educations 
percentage standing at 64%, 53,2% and 53,1%. On the other end of that spec-
trum is Slovenia 10%, Greece 11,9% and Italy with 12,1% with the least amount 
of tertiary education amongst the non-EU- born migrants. Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Belgium house the highest shares of non- EU-born residents with only pre-
primary, primary and lower secondary education (Diaconu, 2015).  
 
3.3.3 Global Effects of Migration on Employment and Wages 
 
IMF (2016) has concluded three main ways migration affects wages of 
native workers. Firstly, there exists a labor supply effect which presumes that if 
the arriving migrants have similar prerequisites and skill levels as the native 
workers it leads to an unfavorable effect on the labor employment and existing 
wages in sectors mi- grants are supplying. Hence, if migrants’ skill levels com-
plement the natives level meaning that lesser overlapping there is in between 
natives and migrants subse- quently the pressure of displacing natives out of 
their jobs while wages diminish is lower (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
Secondly, macro economics use a term called aggregate demand effect, 
which in turn depicts the event where an increase in population occur in relation 
with greater demand for goods and services needed resulting in a growing out-
put by companies which thus increases the overall labor demand. In longer run 
this effect should boost more investments as well as stabilize the opposing ef-
fects of the labor force expansion (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
Thirdly, immigration might be a reason to changes in the mix of produced 
goods and services hence the allocation of resources, product mix and technol-
ogy effects might take place. Potentially it can affect the alignment of occupa-
tions and industries within a nation and improve technologies concerning pro-
duction (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
  
According to IMF (2016) despite the aforementioned effects of migration 
to native workers, the implications usually remain rather insignificant. Most sig-
nificant migration waves both in Europe have been proven to have very limited 
effect on the wages especially. Arguably migrants and natives work in different 
segments in the labor force hence their influence to one another is inconsistent 
and the compatibility between these two groups is quite low. Interestingly, some 
research quotes that in Europe the displacement of native workers by migrants 
is higher than in the US for instance (Aiyar et al., 2016).  
The size of the effects listed above is often determined by few different 
factors in place. Firstly, the substitutability of skills between natives and mi-
grants plays an important part, since the influx of migrants displacing lower 
wage jobs can be of the essence. Meanwhile immigration might affect the poor-
est working class the most, while higher paid workers can in turn gain from this 
effect. This has been proven to take place in Switzerland and Spain for instance 
(Aiyar et al., 2016). Interestingly empirical data exists from Germany by EIB 
(2016) to further support this argument. Indication exists that 1 % increase in in 
labor force with interior migration increase the the unemployment rate of immi-
grants by 1,16 % while it suppressed the wages by 1,09 % thereby the wages of 
the native born increase and unemployment falls. To summarize, this study im-
plies that the wages amongst natives tend to increase with the expense foreign 
workforce. High skilled workers have better chance of benefiting more than less 
skilled and finally, older workers benefit more than younger employees.  
Additionally, labor market flexibility plays and imperative role as well. 
During the acts of war in 90s in the Balkans, Bosnians and people from Kosovo 
displaced native workers in countries with relatively higher employment protec-
tion and inelastic wages (Aiyar et al., 2016). Lastly, the size and current state of 
the economy in addition to the magnitude of the immigration flow defines greatly 
how much direct effect it has in displacing lower wage sector jobs                  
(Aiyar et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3.4 Short and Medium Term Fiscal Ramifications 
 
Migration touches many aspects of economic growth and development 
which differs amongst the stages of development within a state. History proves 
evidence that short and medium term migration flows have integral fiscal di-
mensions. EIB (2016) and European Commission highlight through their studies 
that fiscal costs during the recent refugee crisis are short-lived and thus bal-
anced by benefits of integration carried out in the medium term. EIB continues 
to argue that their study coincides with IMF findings: In the short run fiscal costs 
are equivalent of 0,1% of European GDP between 2015-2017, meanwhile the 
EU GDP will grow marginally according to estimates by +0,13% by 2017. How-
ever medium term projections possess more positive outlook for growth in total, 
especially for countries with higher migration inflows. Evidently these calcula-
tions depend on prompt labor market integration, migrants’ skills and age dis-
persion. Lack of integration has the potential of decreasing the GDP per capita 
and while increasing the unemployment rate (Bernabe et al., 2016). 
 
3.3.5 Labor Market Policies in European Union 
 
EU consistently pursues the promotion and enhancement of unified labor 
market policies addressing for instance employment standards, labor mobility 
and social progress across its member states. Strategies such as, The Europe-
an Employment Strategy (EES) provides guidelines and employment programs 
such as Employment and Social Innovation (EIS) which is an integral aspect in 
cherishing the future well-being of EU’s common market place. Despite the su-
pranational efforts of promoting inclusive and sustainable labor market in EU in 
a coordinated manner, according to Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the ability of 
implementing employment and labor market policies remains solely on member 
states ability and sovereignty to do so. This reason ale, justifies a further exam-
ination of comparative analysis on two member states equaling in size and pop-
ulation with different approaches on labor market and migration policy in order 
to cross reference the differences and provide analysis on shortcomings and 
successes of each respective state and its implemented policy (Kraatz, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
  
4 Sweden 
 
4.1 Labor Market 
 
4.1.1 Overview 
 
Sweden’s labor market is flourishing in terms of the labor force expan-
sion which has been complimented by rapid inclusion on female workers. Solid 
growth in employment has contributed greatly to Sweden’s economy and thus 
placing Sweden high in the OECD rankings for lowest unemployment rating 
standing at roughly 7% from an average of 8 % in 2012-2014. Additionally, 
Sweden has one of the highest employment ratings amongst other OECD 
member states (IMF, 2015).  
Despite exemplary unemployment and labor force strength in Sweden, 
the participatory rates and unemployment figures showcase how segregated 
the market in reality is. Especially among the low skilled and people of foreign 
background indicate unbalanced employment figures. Unemployment stood at 
19% during 2014 with a 16% representation from foreign-born workers. In con-
trast to the absolute unemployment in Sweden, the break down of these statis-
tics is off the essence to fully examine the health of the entire labor market 
(IMF, 2015).  
Swedish policy makers have passed labor market reforms consisting of 
re- defining the unemployment eligibility, lowering the effective taxes on low in-
come earners and tightening the sickness benefit requisites which in turn has 
been pivotal for inclination in participation rates amongst the youngest, oldest 
and foreign descendant. Current influx of migration has had a noticeable effect 
in the labor supply, while the composition of migrant labor force consists mainly 
of asylum seeking refugees. (IMF, 2015). Unemployment amongst the people in 
disadvantaged positions (mainly, elderly and disabled) were projected to rise 
from 70% in 2015 to 75% in 2016. (Swedish Public Employment Service, 2015). 
Therefore, IMF (2015) argues that, as the labor force composition evolves, it 
creates difficulties for Sweden to adapt and maintain its strong workforce base, 
in addition with surging migration, the current unprecedented employment num-
bers give reason to believe demographic challenges lie a head regardless of the 
current state of labor force  
 
 
  
4.1.2 Labor Market Trends 
 
The increase in labor supply, and better yet employment amongst work-
ers with medium and high skill set, has served them well with falling unemploy-
ment ratings. On the contrary low skilled labor force has experienced negative 
correlation in comparison to medium and high skilled labor. Unemployment 
tends to rise while employment reduces despite the annual growth of the ag-
gregate employment which has averaged 1,4% from 2010 to present day. Es-
pecially foreign labor has under- gone a decline in employment regardless of 
their boost in rising employment figures, due to the fact that the broad presence 
of foreign workers in the labor market often offsets the growing employment. 
Unfortunately, an additional division in skill levels has gapped the labor force 
structure even further and its casting clouds in the horizon of Swedish labor 
market (IMF, 2015).  
According to Swedish Public Employment Service (2015), the entire in-
crease in the workforce in 2015 was contributed by people born foreign to Swe-
den. For 2015 and 2016 the projected increase stood at 110,00 people between 
the age of 16-64. Since the fertility rates are falling, Sweden is currently more 
than ever de- pendent on the future labor supply growth of foreign labor. High 
demand for labor remains at growing figures. As stated before the forecasted 
employment demand until 2016 was 110,00 workers, which consists of a de-
mand for 50,000 people to be employed in ages between 16-64 in 2015 and 
60,000 in 2016, totaling workforce in Sweden at 4,7 million (Swedish Public 
Employment Service, 2015). This upward sloping trend remains promising for 
migration to gap the needed workforce. Additionally, employment growth is ex-
pected to grow amongst all age groups, however young people are expected to 
benefit the most. This is mainly due to an employment increase in sectors de-
manding lower education and work experience. Lastly, temporary employment 
as well contributes greatly towards growth in employment particularly within 
younger generations (Swedish Public Employment Service, 2015). The positive 
outlook for Swedish labor market is rather promising for migration to substitute 
and support the workforce base, which in turn speeds the economic and social 
integration of migrants and supports the shrinking populations. 
Swedish Public Employment Service has mechanisms is place which 
have boosted immigrants earlier entries into the labor market. Growing rates of 
migration due to the refugee crisis in Europe, has led the agency to believe that 
immigration paves the way to unlock a future potential in migration as a valua-
ble asset as the country enters into a yet competitive global labor force market 
and shrinking fertility rates (Swedish Public Employment Service, 2015).  
  
The outlook for employment for migrants remains complicated. In Swe-
den migrants tend to receive high rates of employment yet the process of inte-
gration remains rather prolonged. Historical data by IMF (2015) suggests that 
migrants are able to reach 50% employment rate after 5 years of arrival and 
60% rate after 10 years of integration in comparison with native swedes em-
ployment at roughly 78%. After 20 years of integration migrants might achieve 
employment rate of up to 73%. Event though the employment rate stands at 
exemplary heights, the rather tiresome integration process in Sweden presents 
an issue with rising employment gaps higher than in any Nordic country espe-
cially with low-skilled labor. This issue troubles the native population as well 
(IMF, 2015).  
As Sweden’s economy demands an annual growth of 1,25% in labor 
force, the growing migration poses many threats in regard with sustained em-
ployment. IMF (2015) presents alarming figures, since majority of immigrants in 
Sweden are asylum seekers, meaning that according to IMF data, for asylum 
seekers it requires relative more time to integrate economically which translates 
to potential increase in unemployment.  
 
4.2 Demography 
 
4.2.1 History of Sweden’s Demographic Developments 
 
For the past century Sweden has undergone a gradual and continuous 
in- crease in population aging. The share of elderlies has more than doubled 
thus distressing the already frail health care system in place for elderly citizens. 
Pivotal moment in Sweden’s demographic developments, contributing to current 
aging populations, is better known as generation of baby boomers born after 
WW2. The era contributed unprecedented birth rates which in turn accelerated 
the population growth. Regardless of the post-war era fertility, baby boomers 
are currently becoming a liability and remarkable burden for Sweden’s de-
mographics as they are aging rapidly. Hence workers entering the labor market 
are in relation vastly smaller than the generation of baby boomers, creating an 
imbalanced population pyramid and raising concerns of the outlook for econom-
ic future of the state and its citizens (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010).  
 
 
  
The percentage of population over 65 in Sweden has increased from 8% 
to 17% during the 20th century, marking a definitive change in the developments 
concerning population aging. The pyramid in 1900, where each population in-
terval is showcased in percentage and left side depicts males and right side 
females (Figure 3.1), illustrates a classical shape consisting of a broad base of 
young population which flattens evenly as the age progresses. Typical phe-
nomena across all agricultural societies across the globe. In 2000 the structural 
changes were substituted with a wider age dispersion shown as a small base 
and widening top. The amount of elderlies is forecasted to push the shape of 
the pyramid to an even more rectangular shape in future (Bengtsson & Scott, 
2010).  
 
 
4.2.2 Population Aging in Sweden 
 
Population aging begun as a phenomenon across the developed world 
from the last century with ramifications felt in present time, yet Sweden felt the 
effects worse than other countries. Evidently the main reason for shrinking pop-
ulations and increased share of elderlies, lies in fertility rates and and increased 
life expectancy. In Sweden life expectancy ratio has risen in the past century 
remarkably, while similar developments have been recorded in many parts of 
the world as well. Sweden among few other states, has experienced a constant 
growth in female life expectancy ratio. From 1840 to 2010 the ratio has inclined 
3 months annually for females and males the same rate has been slightly lower. 
This rate has resulted in earlier generations to live on average 9 years older 
than their predecessors. The gained progress in life expectancy has been van-
guard, however there has been no indications that the rate will decelerate, but it 
is bound to do so at certain point (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010).  
  
The predominate reason affecting population growth from 20th century to 
pre- sent day, despite the growing life expectancy ratio, are declining fertility in 
Sweden. Interestingly Bengtsson & Scott’s (2010) cited data from and American 
demographer Ansley Coale, yields the following. Had the fertility rates remained 
constant the age structure would have had very limited impact from 1860 to 
1950, even if the life expectancy had increased. The study continues to con-
clude that even if mortality remained untouched at levels resembling 1860, and 
had fertility rates developed as if they realistically did, the outcome in 1950 had 
close resemblance in comparison to the actual age structure. Therefore, the 
population aging was solely due to the declining fertility rates. As seen on Table 
3.2. another comparative study concluded by Bengttson and Scott (2010) ar-
gues that the declining fertility rates affected population growth throughout the 
20th century just as they did in the mid 1950s.  
In 1920s a stable population theory was introduced to illustrate the corre-
lation of fertility and mortality rates. The time need in order for a population to 
reach equilibrium (steady age structure) is dependent on the relation of mortality 
and fertility rates. In Sweden this theory is forecasting a constant yet less bene-
ficial age pyramid in the near future. Fewer and fewer people will be engage in 
the working age population while majority will shift into age groups of older age, 
except this theory fails to account immigration as a contributing factor (Bengts-
son & Scott, 2010).  
Additionally, a noteworthy aspect influencing the population aging in 
Sweden is population momentum. In the early years of 20th century Sweden 
experienced a positive population momentum, meaning the previous generation 
were smaller than the following generation. Positive population momentum was 
fueled by high fertility rates which in turn would perpetually increase and there-
fore grow the number of people being born. In contrast, if population momentum 
is negative the population can be excepted to decrease over time (Bengtsson & 
Scott, 2010). The latter seems to prevail since the 1960s in Sweden.  
Furthermore, another fact contributing negatively in Sweden is the rela-
tive generational spacing. Generational spacing is calculated from mother’s age 
as she gives birth to her middle child. In Sweden this has declined roughly since 
1870. In 1960s the span was on average 26 years in comparison to 2010, the 
same span stood at 30 years. With a constant fertility rate, population growth is 
evidently corre- lating with generational spacing. Diminishing spacing conveys a 
favorable effect on population growth concludes (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010).  
 
  
As argued earlier in the paper, a healthy fertility rate of 2.0 according to 
Bernabè et al., (2016) further demonstrates that the fertility rate of 1.6 in 2000 
and the current standing of 1,9 in 2014 (World Bank 2014) depicts a rather 
gloomy fore- seeable population growth for Sweden, meaning as the old-
dependency ratio will grow, Sweden is facing difficulties substituting their work-
force with foreign labor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4.3 Effect of Immigration on Population Aging 
 
Immigration has been often offered as a counter measure to substitute ag-
ing populations. Migrants usually are represented in abundance in lower work-
ing ages, which therefore offers a positive boost in the working age population. 
However, this setting is more complex than it sounds (Bengtsson & Scott, 
2010).  
25% of Swedish population were either born outside the country or either 
one of their parents is foreign born, raising concerns how the age dispersion 
would look like without migrants. Immigration indeed has controlled the share of 
elderly population, with limited success. If Sweden had not experienced immi-
gration, the population above 65 would stand in 2010 at roughly 20% instead it 
effectively was roughly 17% according to (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010). Even 
though these calculations took into account the immigration fertility, immigration 
had a quantifiable yet mild effect on aging (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010). Another 
noteworthy fact is that immigration should happen with compounding rate, since 
aging immigrants themselves contributed to population aging as well, and if im-
migration is to compensate for population aging it should happen incrementally. 
Immigrants arriving in Sweden are in their most fertile and childbearing years as 
they often have more children than natives. This figure often distorts the truth. 
Even if fertility rates tend to vary among women with different nationalities, evi-
dently women arriving in Sweden from countries with higher fertility rate, they 
tend to adapt into Swedish society and its declining fertility rates, argues 
(Bengtsson & Scott, 2010).  
Stable population theory in recent history has been adapted to account the 
influence of migration. Several studies conclude that immigrations effects on 
age structure can vary widely reliant on migrants’ fertility, yet results make it 
apparent that the effective impact of migration is heavily dependent on the post 
migration fertility that remains (Bengtsson & Scott, 2010). Bengtsson and Scott 
(2010) discuss the effectiveness of immigration since the impact of immigrants 
will not yield remark- able shifts in alleviating shrinking population. Bengttson 
and Scott (2010) proceed to argue that in order for migration to effectively con-
tribute to demographic crisis ahead, an imperative prerequisite stands above all. 
Migrants must integrate properly and in a swift manner into the Swedish work-
force in order for migration to outweigh its negative consequences. Unemploy-
ment as well, amongst immigrants tends to be higher in Sweden. In 2001 men 
with foreign background had an effective employment rate of 78% in compari-
son to 86% for Swedish men. Thus the real unemployment stood at approxi-
mately 30% for men with immigrant background and 18% for the natives 
(Bengtsson & Scott, 2010).  
  
4.4 Summary 
 
Swedish labor market has realized the problems affiliated with population 
de- cline and despite their proactive policies and flexible tax system and eco-
nomic integration of immigrants. Fertility rate and life expectancy in addition with 
baby boomer generation is considered to be the main driver of population aging 
in Sweden. As the Swedish population continues to age, their saturated labor 
market composition offers signs that policy makers have realized the potential 
of immigrant workforce to aid in closing the gap in labor market demand. How-
ever, signals indicating labor market participation amongst immigrants is rather 
low, while the labor market is quite divided in terms of high skilled and low 
skilled workforce suggesting that the Swedish labor market has not been as 
swift in its integration of immigrants. The fact remains that for immigration to 
substitute labor demand, the rate for net immigration must continue to rise in 
order for immigration to ease the fiscal imbalances created by the growing 
share of older population. Considering the decreasing fertility rates and demo-
graphic imbalance of baby boomers, evidence suggest that as previously fertile 
immigrants begin to integrate into Swedish society, fertility rates fall accordingly, 
which contribute towards falling rates across the country. The fact that after 10 
years of integration data from IMF (2015) suggests that 73% of immigrant em-
ployment rate remains rather low after a decade of integration which implies 
that integration process in Sweden is rather slow. All in all, the labor demand in 
Sweden is growing annually and already immigrants have been able to inte-
grate and meet the labor market demands. Sweden has mechanisms in place 
aiding immigrants towards employment, which in turn means Swedish labor 
market in context of EU could be characterized as rather flexible and adaptive, 
contributing positively to- wards migrants swift and proper economic integration 
which arguably is the fastest way to provide sustained economic effects of mi-
gration.  
4.4.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5 Hungary  
 
5.1 Labor Market 
 
5.1.1 Overview 
 
The Hungarian labor market has undergone structural changes in labor 
market demands in the past decades. OECD (2016) emphasizes that restructur-
ing has lead to a surge in demand of higher skilled labor which in turn suppress 
the low skilled workforce. The shift in Global value chains (GVCs) is due to 
globalization, which has accelerated the restructuring of value chains across the 
globe. Companies in technology sectors have influenced the Hungarian labor 
market deeply. Pre- dominant trend in OECD countries is shift towards more 
technology oriented sectors in the economy which has begun to affect the labor 
market in Hungary as well. GVCs are expected to generate positive job oppor-
tunities in Hungary as the demand for high skilled labor continues to create a 
sustained demand for educated workforce. Skill demand and wages are thus 
expected to rise. However, the booming demand for educated workers has had 
an adverse effect on gap between skilled and low skilled workforce and thus 
unemployment is expected to rise rapidly among low skilled workers, argues 
OECD (2016). Technical professions such and ICT related jobs have have 
made an unforeseen impact in the labor market resulting in in- creased demand 
in educated and skilled labor (OECD, 2016).  
Structural reforms have impacted the educational level to a deep extent 
and the adjustment of educational sector has been rather inconclusive. Hence 
labor shortages in the labor market have become an issue. Shortages have be-
come more common in manufacturing due to lack of competency. Such symp-
toms are mainly due to misalignments in educational output, hence inflating the 
youth unemployment (OECD, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
  
The lack of employment possibilities among the low and high skilled la-
bor force is within the highest in OECD countries. Typically, low skilled laborers 
suffer from 50% long-term unemployment rate after being absent for more than 
one year from the labor market while, regional differences impact employment 
considerably as well states OECD (2016). Workers suffering from long-term 
unemployment are often assimilated with incompetent skill set, highlighting the 
importance of adequate educational opportunities at older age. Figure 4.1 
shows how the labor shortages are reaching highest levels in OECD countries. 
Labor shortages are shown as a percentage of firms employing upwards of 10 
or more employees. Meaning approx. 47% of all accounted firms in Hungary 
employ 10 or more employees (OECD, 2016).  
 
Hungarian labor market lacks of utilizing women’s skills to remarkable 
extent. Despite the labor demand and employment opportunities for instance in 
service sector, women have not been able to harness these job possibilities. 
OECD (2016) draws the conclusion that females represent 2/3 of the graduates 
in tertiary education, showcasing the importance of female participation in the 
labor market. Figure 4.2 underlines that the unemployment of females happens 
especially at both ends of the age spectrum. In comparison to EU average, 
Hungary is aligning quite well, however the inclusion in Sweden seemingly ex-
cels Hungary and EU28 countries. Tightening legislation was introduced in 
Hungary which forced older age and disabled women to participate in labor 
market as a measurement the to fight the aging of population. Hungarian wom-
en are often faced with either parenthood or employment which aids the division 
amongst females wanting to engage in the labor market (OECD, 2016).  
 
 
  
Lastly, Hungarian government has shown initiative to alleviate labor mar-
ket inconsistencies by implementing active labor market policies (ALMPs), 
mainly via public works programs. However, OECD (2016) states that ALMPs 
have very limited effect on addressing the skills shortage. Spending concerning 
labor market policies has doubled in size to 0,8% of GDP in 2013 from the past 
decade, while spending on education and training is lower than in the past dec-
ade.  
 
5.1.2 Contemporary Developments in Employment 
 
According to a Hungarian Labor Market report by (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 
2016) there was a decrease in the core labor force between ages of 15-64 of 
60,000 peo- ple from 2015 to 2016 which constituted much of the demographics 
implications. An immediate and popular reaction to increase the labor force is 
focused on raising the official retirement age which in Hungary has maintained 
150,000 workers in the labor market (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 2016). Hungary exceed-
ed the pre-financial crisis level of labor force in 2013, however in 2014 the work-
force expanded by 208,000 workers according to a Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) survey cited by (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 2016). In 2015 the number of people 
in employment increased by 110,000 to 4,2 million in total, showing record 
breaking numbers since 1992. Employment rate in 2015 was nearly 64% which 
in contrast increased by 9 percentage-points from 2010. The Hungarian Labor 
Market report finds causality due to three major factors.  
 
 
 
  
Firstly, the domestics labor market expansion has become integral in the 
developments of the labor market growth. CSO has reported an 62,000 people 
incline in people employed in 2015 from 2015. Government statistical institu-
tions have re- ported and increase of 54,000 registered employees, with com-
panies of upwards from 5 employees (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 2016). Manufacturing 
accounts as the back- bone of economic activities in Hungary, and employment 
in this sector grew to 626,000 people with conflicting changes existing in ratios 
of employment in different sectors of manufacturing. For instance, car industry 
increased by 7,4% while textile industry declines significant losses in employ-
ment ratios. Another high growth contributor was accommodation and tourism 
sector employment grew 6,6% while technical and scientific sector grew slightly 
more, 6,9%.  
Secondly public works were another driving force in employment in 2015 
and continues to have a sustained effect on the Hungarian work force. Zsuzsa 
& Karoly (2016) reports an average of 212,000 people working in government 
funded projects in 2016, which is an increase of 36,000 from 2015. Over a third, 
36,2% of the registered unemployed workforce were involved in the public 
works program, leaving the ratio of unskilled employees at 40% (Zsuzsa & Ka-
roly, 2016).  
Thirdly, employment growth considering people employed abroad is the 
last concluding factor facilitating growing numbers of employment in Hungary. 
CSO survey estimates that 111,000 people were working full-time outside Hun-
gary, mostly of these people residing in Austria, and majority of the people 
commute from Hungary to Austria on regular basis (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.1.3 Youth Employment & Education  
 
Zsuzsa & Karoly (2016) provide conclusive evidence that Hungarian 
economy suffers from a noticeable under educated and unemployed youth. Un-
employment amongst youth rate declined from 20,4% in 2015 to 17,3% in 2016. 
Despite three percentage point decline, practically one out of five under 25 is 
unemployed. The main cause of unemployment affecting youth unemployment, 
lies in high rates of school interruptions and dropouts. Consequently, searching 
a job is prolonged. Regardless of decrease in youth unemployment, lion share 
of unemployment is due to NEET (Young People Not in Employment, Education 
or Training) which remains relatively high. The share of unemployed with a sec-
ondary education as primary education, are mainly referred to as unskilled, 
barely decreased from 2015 to 2016. Meanwhile the percentage of vocational 
school certificated decreased by 13,000 and students finishing secondary 
school the number fell by 10,000 people. Graduates with vocational diploma 
benefitted the most in terms of employment since they had the greatest share of 
employment as a share of the young workforce (Zsuzsa & Karoly, 2016).  
OECD (2016) a club of 34 richest countries in the world, reportedly un-
derline the importance of structural changes affecting the Hungarian economy 
during the past decades. The enrollment for secondary education has grown 
with a healthy pace and increase of 28 percentage points can be observed from 
1993 to 2013 in school enrollment rates. Due to recent developments, the share 
of uneducated people amongst the older generations haunts the labor market. 
The share of people pursuing undergraduate’s degree quadrupled from 1995 to 
2013. As uplifting as it may sound the amount of people graduating was 23%, 
however it remains lower than the OECD average. Yet the unemployment rate 
for graduates stood at merely 3,7%. Despite the surge in people participating in 
educational sector, the phenomenon is rather new as the educational level with 
older generations is rather marginal, concludes OECD (2016).  
The epidemic of youth unemployment and tertiary graduation rates cre-
ates justified concerns over the developments of the Hungarian labor force. 
Graduates with vocational education are associated with high unemployment 
figures, as wages are 25% lower in comparison to graduate with secondary de-
gree diploma. Mean- while the gap between low-skilled and high skilled individ-
uals deepens as low skilled suffer from increased unemployment rates. Since 
the shift in labor force is demand- ing increasingly more educated individuals 
the educational output is unable to meet the demands of the future according to 
OECD (2016).  
 
  
5.2 Population Aging in Hungary 
 
Hungarian government’s long-term spending is greatly affected by popula-
tion ageing. OECD (2016) projections forecast short term spending to decrease 
until 2030 as the total spending will increase to 3,75% of GDP until 2060. The 
organization for economic cooperation and development boldly proceeds to ar-
gue the advanced state of population aging taking place in Hungary happens at 
faster rate than in any other country.  
Hungary’s population peeked in 1981 while the country posses the lowest 
fertility rate in Europe. Population in Hungary peaked in early 1980s at 11 mil-
lion. OECD (2016) projects a downfall to 9,2 million in 2060, even though the 
relative decrease in the share of prime age population has been stable, howev-
er by 2060 the decrease would make the share of prime age population would 
be the smallest in Europe according to projections accounting in coming migra-
tion of 20,000 annually. Figure 4.3 estimates the prime age population (ages 
25-54) of total population to shrink to 34% by 2060, placing Hungary amongst 
most severely affected countries of shrinking populations in Europe. Fertility 
rate in 2013 was additionally one of the lowest in Europe at 1.2 babies born for 
each women on average in their lifetime (Figure 4.4). Further studies by OECD 
argues a causality if income disparities maintain spreading apart, migration 
struggles to fill the void in labor market while emigration from Hungary might 
increase and further hamper the demographic outlook.  
 
 
Age-related spending consisting mainly of health care expenses are rising 
faster than forecasted. Health care spending is currently at acceptable and sta-
  
ble rates according to OECD standards. As Hungarian wages are reaching the 
levels of other EU countries, meaning a noticeable increase in health care 
spending per capita is underway (OECD, 2016). Albeit, OECD (2016) reports a 
brain drainage in health care industry and doctors especially are emigrating the 
country already. The health care system has suffered from lack of investments 
and symptoms of a deteriorating system are observable, leaving long-term care 
mainly in the arms of immediate family for many Hungarians adds OECD 
(2016).  
5.3 Effects of Migration on Population Aging 
 
Since Hungary emerged into the EU as a member state, a new wave of 
emigration has had a considerable effect on Hungary. Hungary’s net migration 
has remained at 20,000 or below from 2006, with the exception of 2006 when 
an observable peak was recorded over 35,000 migrants (European Liberal Fo-
rum, 2014). European Liberal Forum (2016) further argues that the effects of 
migration have affected the falling demographics in Hungary for extended peri-
ods of time. The level of net migration in Hungary was previously comparable 
with Western and Southern European countries rather than Eastern European 
countries which are prone to experience effects of emigration than migration.  
Addressing the falling populations in Hungary has been underpinned by in-
teresting and specific characteristics argues Anikó et al., (2009). As the total 
number of population is falling immigration has had its fair share in compensat-
ing the Hungarian population decline especially from 1990s to 2000s as the de-
cline in population aging waned. However, Anikó et al., (2009) proceed to claim, 
that during 2001- 2007 population losses of 225,000 persons was compensated 
by immigration contributing of 100,000 people, totaling the loss at 155,000 peo-
ple. Today the situation has presumably worsened according to the same study 
due to acceleration in population aging. The effects of immigration on Hungari-
an demographics are highly limited by the success in fostering long-term migra-
tion, regardless of the circular type of migration dominating immigration (Anikó 
et al., 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Census from Anikó et al., (2009) on potential sizes and age distributions of 
immigration from 2001-2050 substituting for population loss, suggests best case 
scenario of 10,000 net immigrants annually on average remains realistic. Addi-
tion- ally, the same projection, estimates long-term immigration to exceed 
20,000 people topped with 2,000-5,000 in net emigration. Combining the effects 
of aging populations and the forecasted net immigration, Hungary has potential 
to partly compensate aging populations with the combination of immigration and 
emigration if the projections prevail. On the other hand, abrupt immigration of 
possible younger work- force may forcibly affect the native labor market nega-
tively, argues Anikó et al., (2009). However, exaggerated interpretation of pre-
vious migration patterns and assumptions has potential to distort the outlook of 
actual future inflows of migration adds, Anikó et al., (2009).  
Notably consistency in movements in migration within Hungary are re-
gional discrepancies, creating imbalances and regional pressures on the local 
governments and age structure. Immigration is highly concentrated in the cen-
tral regions of Hungary, especially in Budapest and areas near Serbian border 
(Anikó et al., 2009). Indicators conclude that immigration outside Budapest has 
slowly declined, with North-Western regions receiving barely noticeable share of 
immigrants. Both naturalization and work permits have similar regional tenden-
cies as the immigration flow towards Budapest underlines its regional im-
portance, suggests (Anikó et al., 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.4 Summary 
 
Hungarian demographic decline is happening faster than anywhere in Eu- 
rope. The government has very limited effort in implementing sufficient policies 
and mechanisms in place to address the issue except the ALMPs. Hungarian 
labor mar- ket is comprised of relatively high amount of uneducated work force, 
the share of low skilled in relation to high skilled workforce is rather high. Con-
sequently, labor shortages of highly educated is causing problems in the labor 
market which has lead to problems in employment rates. Labor market in Hun-
gary can be characterized by relative share of emigrating workforce rather than 
settling immigrants. Regional differences regarding immigration are noticeable 
across the nation. Unfortunately, the low share of completion of tertiary educa-
tion fuels the low skilled workforce and fuels the growth of uneducated youth in 
Hungary. Women inclusion into the labor market is shockingly low, which in turn 
deepens the issues in labor market composition and covering the fiscal imbal-
ances of population aging which is happening at staggering rates in comparison 
to other EU member states. Fundamentally Hungarian labor market experienc-
es variety of domestic issues with uneducated and unemployed youth which 
evidently forces the policy makers to prioritize their labor market policies to 
promote youth inclusion and education in order to sustain the labor market 
short- ages, meanwhile, emigration and immigration remains a topic affecting 
labor market fundamentally while the inclusion of immigrant workforce remains 
unknown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 Conclusion 
 
Demographic decline and aging populations is a global phenomena affect-
ing economies with compounding and long term consequences. Thus meas-
urement of fiscal and labor market effects is hard to grasp in short term eco-
nomic developments. Regardless of the reasons why people decide to immi-
grate, whether its forced migration or economic migration, the macro economic 
effects of migration are arguably, positive. An Increase in demand and con-
sumption results in more in- vestments and employment suggests IMF. More 
there are people consuming in a society the consumption results in a growing 
GDP. However, structural hardship succeeds in the long run as demand for 
skilled workforce grows leaving native and immigrating workforce to collide 
since evidence suggests that migrants tend to flow towards stronger economies 
rather than weak ones. Migrants bring talent and hu- man capital to labor mar-
ket which already exists and therefore saturates the labor market even further, 
fueling the labor market challenges and structural problems. However, the eco-
nomic inclusion of migrant’s workforce is imperative since the labor demand in 
the future is surging and many low skilled migrants are willing to partake in jobs 
natives are not, such as manufacturing implies OECD studies. Structural unified 
labor market policies across member states provide fertile ground to develop 
the Pan-European labor market, since structural labor market issues between 
mi- grants and natives will increasingly affect employment and economic inclu-
sion for everybody.  
Global declining demographic trend is ubiquitous, with far reaching with only 
speculative consequences available concerning the macro economic effects 
and labor market implication globally. In developed countries populations are 
aging fastest compared to developing countries. EU member states will need to 
sustain increasingly more migrating labor force in order to provide economic 
growth and healthy fiscal balances suggesting that migration has major poten-
tial to act as mean to bridge this gap in workforce demand if educational possi-
bilities are aligned with realistic educational outcomes and possibilities for all 
labor force participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Member states in Europe enjoy significant power in determining their immi-
gration policies and especially labor market policies. EU supports cohesive and 
coherent measures taken to protect the single common market place of 28 
member states. Therefore, active measurement and dedication from each 
member state to unify and protect the single economy remains integral in ad-
dressing the economic hardship provided by demographic crisis. Through effec-
tive analysis, unilateral immigration and labor market policies on both national 
and supranational level should be addressed in order to fulfill the future demand 
of foreign labor as European economies are facing dramatic losses in work-
force. Whether immigration is consisting of expatriates, refugees or emigrating 
workforce, recognizing immigration as a powerful economic tool, which has po-
tential to unlock significant resources to support sustainable economic growth 
seems imperative according to research. However, re- search suggests that, if 
immigrants experience lack of economic integration and inclusive workforce, the 
repercussions are economically far reaching and severe, with adverse effects 
potentially straining economies and aging workforces with unprecedented long 
term burden. Alas, immigration alone fails to fulfill the losses sustained from 
population aging, nonetheless its economic importance should not be under- 
mined by political narrative.  
Swedish economy, and particularly the labor market, hosts a relatively high 
share of immigrants’ workforce or ties to foreign born population, which has had 
significant impact on Swedish economy as a whole indicates prior research. 
Despite the lowest overall unemployment rates in developed countries, the 
workforce is quote segregated while gaps between low skilled and high skilled 
is growing while immigrants suffer from lowest participatory rates despite deci-
sive labor market pol- icy implementation measures in place. On the other hand, 
data suggests that, immigrants adjust to Swedish culture in a fairly quick man-
ner, in regard of Swedish fertility. Migrants fertility rates in Sweden are falling 
faster they integrate, offsetting the much needed demographic boost from mi-
gration. Despite generational spacing and limited effects of fertility rates, biggest 
underlying problem is the recently starting aging of baby boomer generation. 
Since Sweden can arguably be considered as an example state across many 
societal issued, even constantly increasing immigration simply will not cover the 
void left by the generation, leaving policy makers with very little option to allevi-
ate aging demographics.  
 
 
 
  
In Hungary population aging is happening at staggering rates in 
comparison any other EU member states, policy formulation ought to consider 
addressing primarily their growing youth unemployment and high rates of inter-
ruptions in tertiary education. Additionally, the lack of women inclusion in the 
work force is shockingly low. Hungarian policymakers are facing difficult times, 
which furthermore fuel suspicions and reasonable concern how effectively can 
Hungary integrate immigrants into their labor force and economy to compensate 
for falling demographics, as they are experiencing and struggling to address 
serious domestic labor market challenges in the first place. Consequently, re-
search concludes that labor market policies ought to address the inclusion of 
domestic workers while creating the foundations to attract foreign high skilled 
labor force, to compensate for labor shortages, while actively cooperating with 
EU on implementing ALMPs and other guidelines to increase the labor market 
participation especially outside Budapest where regional differences are strong-
est. Lastly, the follow through rate in tertiary education is alarmingly low, result-
ing in a weaker work force which in turn struggles to alleviate the increasing 
labor demand as populations grows older implied by thorough analysis. 
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